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Toxic Tort and the Articulation of Environmental Risk
Abstract
Ten women who work in ABC television news studios and offices in Toowong Brisbane Australia, have
developed invasive breast cancer within a relatively short period of time, one of the first diagnoses being
in 2002 (Swan 2007). The unhappy coincidence of ten women in the same workplace developing breast
cancer is disturbingly insidious. Initial investigations were not able to identify a cause or explanation. A
subsequent, very thorough inquiry led by Professor Bruce Armstrong has not been able to identify the
specific cause of the breast cancer either, but it has found that the Brisbane ABC studios present an
unequivocal risk to health. The incidence of breast cancer in women working at the studios was not
considered random or coincidental, it was found to be ten times the expected rate (Armstrong 2006). The
studios have now been abandoned, and all ten cases of breast cancer have been designated a rare
‘cancer cluster’ (Swan 2007).
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Toxic Tort and the Articulation
of Environmental Risk
Jo Goodie
Introduction — Our risk anxiety made real
Ten women who work in ABC television news studios and offices in
Toowong Brisbane Australia, have developed invasive breast cancer
within a relatively short period of time, one of the first diagnoses being
in 2002 (Swan 2007). The unhappy coincidence of ten women in the
same workplace developing breast cancer is disturbingly insidious.
Initial investigations were not able to identify a cause or explanation. A
subsequent, very thorough inquiry led by Professor Bruce Armstrong
has not been able to identify the specific cause of the breast cancer
either, but it has found that the Brisbane ABC studios present an
unequivocal risk to health. The incidence of breast cancer in women
working at the studios was not considered random or coincidental, it
was found to be ten times the expected rate (Armstrong 2006). The
studios have now been abandoned, and all ten cases of breast cancer
have been designated a rare ‘cancer cluster’ (Swan 2007).
Esperance is a reasonably sized but remote town on the southern
coast of Western Australia. It is a place noted for its stunning beaches
which appear impossibly pristine, but parts of the town have been
poisoned by lead carbonate. Up to a thousand native birds have died;
rainwater tanks, backyard veggie patches and chook runs have become
potentially toxic (The West Australian May 5 2007: 8). Six children
have been found to have lead blood levels above recommended health
guidelines (The West Australian May 5 2007: 8). All of this has happened
in a place which, because of its isolation, we would assume to be
outside any zone of toxic risk. However in Esperance, unlike the ABC
Brisbane studios, the source of the toxin is readily identifiable — it
comes from the town’s port where powdered lead carbonate has been
loaded on ships for export.
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Both the ABC and the Esperance cases have been newsworthy
because they tap a common anxiety — that the environment in which
we live and work may harbour unknown toxins, or that the technology
which we use every day may be doing us some sort of harm. In an
interview with Dr Norman Swan on the ABC ‘Health Report’, Nadia
Farha, one of the ABC journalists in Brisbane who developed breast
cancer, articulated this anxiety. Upon learning of the findings of the
Armstrong Inquiry she said:
I was really upset, I think that’s where it actually hit me that maybe
working for the ABC at that particular site I could have got my breast
cancer. And you think that you’d worked for an organisation all of these
years, and you’ve given them the best of your career to find that working
there may eventually kill you brought me down to earth pretty much in
a hurry. I was really shocked, and I think some of the women weren’t that
shocked because I think that’s what they expected but I hadn’t expected
that (Swan 2007).

The fear, anger and frustration felt by Nadia Farha and others
involved in such cases of toxic exposure are easily understood. Douglas
and Wildalsky have observed that in practice the environment is a
pivotal focus of risk anxiety — people are afraid of ‘nothing much …
except the food they eat, the water they drink, the air they breathe, the
land they live on, and the energy they use’ (1982: 10). It is not difficult
to empathise with the strong need of the people involved in these cases
to identify the source of their toxic exposure and to hold somebody
accountable. Especially because, while each of these cases may be
shocking, the circumstances by which the women in the ABC studios
or the people who live in Esperance came to be exposed to something
toxic are not so exceptional. These people were simply living their lives
in a manner not so very different to any other person who works in a
news studio or lives in a country town by the sea. It could have been
one of us who developed cancer because our workplace was a toxic
site, or because our rainwater became undrinkable. It might have been
the beachside town we went to regularly for summer holidays that
became polluted by a toxin as dangerous as lead carbonate.
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The possibility of suing in toxic tort
Taking some sort of legal action, holding somebody accountable and
legally liable, would not be an unusual response to what has happened
in Esperance or for the women who have developed cancer while
working in the ABC Brisbane studio. Suing in ‘toxic tort’ (negligence)
became one of many forms of legal response to the unanticipated
hazards of twentieth-century technology and consumption. It has
been popularised by Hollywood and made practically possible by
innovative legal practitioners such as the plaintiffs’ law firm Slater and
Gordon, which has made its reputation in a number of high profile
‘toxic tort’ cases (Cannon 1998). Toxic tort has become a notorious
field of litigation largely due to the super-sized damages awarded in
mass toxic tort claims in the United States, but also because of claims
that the development of toxic tort doctrine has allowed individuals to
rationalise their misfortune through tenuous connections to improbable
causes (Huber 1991). It is nonetheless exemplary of Sheila Jasanoff ’s
observation that ‘courts are often the first social institutions to give
public voice and meaning to inaudible struggles between human
communities and their technological creations’ (1995: 12). Actions
in toxic tort endorse and articulate risk anxiety, particularly in those
instances where the litigation gives publicity to latent hazards that had
previously been little known in the public domain (Rabin 1993: 126).
As Ulrich Beck observes:
Dangers, it would seem, do not exist ‘in themselves’, independently of our
perceptions. They become a political issue only when people are generally
aware of them; they are social constructs which are strategically defined,
covered up or dramatized in the public sphere with the help of scientific
material supplied for the purpose (1999: 22).

The judicial adjudication of the defendant’s duty of care in the
context of the foreseeability of the risk to which the plaintiff was
exposed, as well as the amassing of evidence of causation, makes toxic
tort litigation the occasion for anxiety about the risks of certain toxins
to be quite publicly acknowledged and delineated. The litigation plays
a not insubstantial role in setting normative standards for our tolerance
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of toxic risk (Havemann 2003: 38, Rabin 2001: 352–3). Toxic tort
litigation also provides a certain type of vehicle for articulating the
relationship between our body, hazards and the environment (KrollSmith & Westervelt 2004, Lee 2000, Rabin 2001).
No one is suing yet, but media reports of what has happened
in Esperance and in the ABC studios have focused on issues and
responses to events which might well presage some of the individuals
affected taking some form of legal action. Various news reports and
documentaries have focused on factors such as the need of people
exposed to dangerous toxins to be heard; their desire to have the
matter properly investigated; their continued anxiety about the toxicity
of their immediate living and working environment; their anger at
becoming the particular victims of a toxic hazard; and their ongoing
concern that there appears to be a continuing toxic risk that might
impact on other people (ABC News Online 27 March 2007, 12 June
2007, Swan 2007, The West Australian 5 May 2007). While these sorts
of concerns are far less tangible than any physical injury the women
who worked at the ABC Brisbane studio or the people of Esperance
may have suffered, they are nevertheless central to their subjective
appreciation of the risk presented by the toxic exposure.
So could either the ABC women or any of the individuals exposed
to lead in Esperance litigate successfully? The source of the toxicity
in the ABC case is elusive, while in Esperance it is pretty clear-cut. It
is therefore unlikely at this stage that it will be possible for the ABC
women to sue, because establishing causation and responsibility for
the exposure appears to be beyond science and in turn the law. But the
circumstances by which some people in Esperance came to unwittingly
make themselves vulnerable to lead poisoning by growing their own
veggies and collecting rain water in tanks may yet be played out in
the courts. Slater and Gordon have been to Esperance and undertaken
investigations into the circumstance of the toxic exposure, but the only
publicly reported action the firm has taken is a letter of demand to the
Minister responsible to establish a compensation scheme which would
allow those affected to avoid litigation (The West Australian 5 May 2007:
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8). Because of their reputation Slater and Gordon’s letter may well have
some persuasive force. But they would know from experience that toxic
tort litigation is an inefficient and often compromised endeavour, both
because the hazards of post-industrial society are difficult to identify
and because the causal nexus between injury/damage and hazard is
difficult to trace (Cannon 1998, Lee 2000).
The success of toxic tort litigation depends on being able to identify
by expert scientific evidence both the nature of the toxin and the causal
link between the plaintiff ’s exposure to the toxin and the injuries
they have suffered. John Fleming acknowledges that ‘[a]n abiding
difficulty of toxic torts is to attribute responsibility to the defendant
amidst other possible causes, such as other pollutants, unrelated diseases
or carcinogens like smoking etc’ (1997: 71). Tort principles of the
nineteenth century were premised on the assumption that there is
usually a single line of causation linking the defendant’s negligence to
the plaintiff ’s injury. However, science and medicine have developed
to the point where an injury may be attributed to a range of possible
causes. The medical model that is employed to determine the actual
cause of the injuries is not based on direct causality. It is based on a
‘multi-factor approach’ which understands ‘the problem of health in
a broader context’ whereby disease can be attributed to exposure to a
variety of toxins as well as the lifestyle and patterns of consumption of
plaintiffs themselves (Lanthier & Olivier 1999: 75). As demonstrated
by the ABC case, scientists cannot always identify a toxin even when
the effects of exposure to it are evident. Scientists also know very little
about the actual effects of many known or suspected toxins, despite
the fact that the effects of exposure to some toxins such as lead are
well documented (Cranor & Eastmond 2001: 11). Even when a causal
link is established the court may determine that at the time of the
exposure the state of knowledge of the particular toxic hazard was so
limited that the harm the plaintiff has suffered was not ‘foreseeable’.
In such a case the defendant would not be expected to know of the
risk or be considered able, in a technical sense, to limit the plaintiff ’s
exposure. (The ABC case is likely to be in this category.) If so, the
defendant will not be found to have breached the duty of care that
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she or he owed to the plaintiff and will not be legally liable (Wyong
Shire Council v Shirt).
And so we come to the issue that is the focus of this paper. If the
toxic exposure at the ABC Brisbane studios or in Esperance were to
become the subject of toxic tort action, and we could think past the
obstacles to litigation in these two cases, what would be the relevance
to any such litigation of the anxiety and concerns of the potential
plaintiffs? How, if at all, would their quite subjective and particular
appreciation of the toxic hazard to which they have been exposed be
assessed? Does what Beck (1992) or Douglas and Wildalsky (1982)
would label the plaintiffs’ ‘risk anxiety’ have any legitimate role in
the determination of a toxic tort claim? I suggest that although toxic
tort litigation clearly does not offer the same forum as a television
documentary or a news report for exploring these matters, it is not
utterly divorced from their significance. As former Australian High
Court Justice Michael McHugh has observed, the application of tort
doctrine ‘depend[s] not only upon the ascertainment of facts but on
a moral and social evaluation of those facts’ (1989: 13).
Discussion of toxic tort cases often focuses on the inevitable disputes
over the veracity of scientific evidence (see for example Cranor &
Eastmond 2001, Edmond & Mercer 2002, 2004, Huber 1991). In
this piece I consider the interaction of scientific evidence with other
more commonplace evidence of the non-expert plaintiff and others
who actually experienced the toxic exposure (as have Jasanoff 1995,
Morrow 2000, Rabin 1993, 2001, Toffolon-Weiss & Timmons Roberts
2004). My object is not so much to determine the degree to which
toxic tort litigation gives public voice and meaning to a plaintiff ’s
particular experience of toxic exposure, although their ‘day in court’
is obviously in some sense an attempt by the plaintiff to give ‘voice’
to their subjective appreciation and particular experience of the toxic
exposure. My analysis is less ambitious; it considers the dynamic
interaction of the scientific and lay evidence in toxic tort litigation.
In doing so I take up the concept of ‘risk’ as a device for examining
and comparing the various ways by which toxic tort litigation engages
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with and analyses a case of toxic exposure that is alleged to have caused
an injury or loss.

Analysing toxic tort litigation
through the figure of risk
In her theorisation of the interrelationship between law and risk Jenny
Steele has observed that risk calculation, vocabulary and techniques
are taken up in litigation in specialised ways to facilitate appropriate
judgments regarding risk-taking limits and responsibilities, although
in other domains they can serve quite a different purpose (2004: 9).
‘Risk’ has many meanings and functions. It is a quantitative, actuarial
calculation which measures the probability of an event occurring
and, as such, is a commodity that can be traded. Risk is also a socially
constructed notion which shapes decision and policy-making (Dean
1999). The concept of risk is readily employed in everyday discourse
and mediates the relationships people have to certain activities (Lupton
1999). It is a label which is attached to hazard, danger and uncertainty
in both a scientific and in an everyday sense (Ewald 1991). Risk is
also culturally constructed as the focus of a certain type of anxiety
(Douglas 1992). None of these understandings of risk is isolated from
other knowledges of risk; indeed, differing conceptions of risk are
often conflated in particular contexts, like the courtroom, to create
wholly unique means of understanding risk suited to a particular task,
such as assigning legal liability (Valverde, Levi & Moore 2005: 86). In
terms of this discussion ‘risk’, simply put, is a way of conceptualising,
measuring and talking about environmental hazards. Rather than
being a label which attaches to certain hazards, ‘risk’ here is a product
of certain forms of thinking and calculation.
The shift from thinking about risk in non-legal terms to assessing its
role in the litigation process is not a straightforward manoeuvre. Steele
observes that the courts necessarily engage in a quite specialised legal
sense with the vocabulary and techniques of risk in their adjudication
of disputes involving the appropriate limits and responsibilities of
risk-taking (2004: 9). Risk is conceptualised and employed by the
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law in a variety of ways. Pat O’Malley’s (2004) depiction of the three
manifestations of risk in the legal domain is applicable to toxic tort
litigation. O’Malley contends that risk is the object of various forms
of legal intervention, the purpose of which is to assign responsibility
for the management of risk-taking. Risks are assigned moral value —
the law either privileges or seeks to limit various forms of risk — and
techniques of risk assessment are employed to determine the limits of
legal liability.

The assessment of risk in the toxic tort claim
Possible exposure to the risk of harm is not enough to found a tort
claim. The plaintiff must be able to demonstrate that they have actually
suffered an injury attributable to the defendant’s negligence. Even
though toxic tort may become an occasion for the litigious expression
of popular risk anxiety, the traditions of common law litigation require
the parties to support their case with expert testimony as to the actual,
rather than simply apprehended, nature of the risk to which the plaintiff
was exposed. Scientific calculations and assessments of the harm the
plaintiff suffered and the actual risk they were exposed to are central
to the resolution of any toxic tort claim. The plaintiff must not only
provide medical evidence of his or her actual injury — that will not
be sufficient to determine the claim. Whether the defendant should
be held responsible for the plaintiff ’s injury will depend in large part
upon the risk calculations of the epidemiologist and the environmental
engineer. The court’s application of various technical or scientific risk
technologies allows an ‘objective’ assessment of both the foreseeability
of the plaintiff suffering an injury as well as the causal nexus between
the injury and the toxic exposure or environment.
However, the success of a plaintiff ’s or defendant’s case is not
wholly determined by scientific and technical expert evidence; it
will also be determined by evidence of other, non-scientific and quite
subjective, calculations of risk. There are four interrelated conceptions
of risk which I take up in the following discussion of the interaction
of scientific and lay evidence in most toxic tort cases. They are: the
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insurantial, the scientific, the everyday or common sense, and the
clinical. The function of insurance has facilitated the emergence of
toxic tort as a specific form of negligence action (Fleming 1992).
The scientific assessment of risk by the epidemiologist has become
increasingly important in toxic tort cases in marking the boundary
between tenable and tenuous claims in toxic tort (Edmonds &
Mercer 2002, Jasanoff, 1995: 16). The role of everyday or common
sense notions of risk is not so evident in toxic tort litigation. Unlike
epidemiological calculations of risk it has not been the focus of
academic debate. Nevertheless the particulars of the plaintiff ’s
claim are scrutinised through the lens of everyday or common sense
conceptualisations of the plaintiff ’s and defendant’s conduct (Valverde,
Levi & Moore 2005: 86, Seltsam v McGuiness). I suggest here that
one way of conceptualising how the individual plaintiff ’s particular
experience of toxic exposure interfaces with broader population-based
assessments of risk produced by the epidemiologist or environmental
engineer is to think of the actual litigation as applying a ‘clinical risk’
approach. Unlike epidemiological assessments of risk, which identify
risks factors across populations, the clinical risk approach conceptualises
the risk in terms of its impact on specific individuals. ‘That is, the
individual is treated not simply as representative of a risk category but
as a unique case to which certain risk factors apply’ (O’Malley 2004:
25). In toxic tort litigation the court to some extent adopts a clinical
gaze or perspective. The court’s assessment of the plaintiff ’s case not
only involves situating the incidence of her or his toxic exposure in
the context of accepted knowledge about the risk associated with
exposure to the toxin. It is also the court’s appreciation of the parties’
personal and quite specific experience and exposure to risk, and their
behaviour in the face of such exposure, which in large part determines
the outcome of the proceedings.

Insurantial risk
Actions in tort take place against and within the operation of various
state regulated and private schemes of insurance. Commentators on
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the development of tort law have identified a number of key effects
insurance and insurability have upon the tort system in general and the
conduct of tort litigation in particular. Perhaps the most profound effect
is identified by Fleming, who argues that without liability insurance
‘the tort system would have long ago collapsed under the weight of
the demands placed upon it’ (1992: 11). As liability insurance became
relatively common the historical conservatism that militated against
the emergence of new forms of action was displaced. Jane Stapelton
observes that the increasing ‘public policy reliance’ on a prudential
response to risk has been paralleled by ‘a general broadening of the
catchment of situations recognised by the courts as giving rise to tort
entitlements’ (1995: 820).
It is argued that liability insurance has transformed the very nature
of tort law. Morton Horwitz, discussing the impact of liability insurance
on the development of tort law in the United States, observes that:
The individualistic world of Warton’s ‘moral causation’ and ‘free agency’
had begun to be transformed into a world of liability insurance in which
the ‘legislative’ question of who should pay would ultimately undermine
the self contained, individualistic categories of private law (1982: 211).

Joanne Conaghan and Wade Mansell are of the view that although
‘individual responsibility continues to be the perspective that informs
most cases, collective responsibility and loss spreading through the
mechanism of liability insurance tends to be the incidental by-product’
(1993: 11). The social theorist François Ewald, who is noted for his
genealogical study of insurantial risk in which he characterises risk not
as a thing but as a form of rationality, also argues that insurance directly
challenges the juridical practice of assigning responsibility according
to legal right (1991: 201). However, rather than insurance being the
passive servant of the law, as Horwitz and Conaghan and Mansell
seem to assume, Ewald reminds us that the law and insurance each
provide a means of assigning responsibility and making compensation
for loss, and that the rationality of each may be applied to the same
object in pursuit of different ends. He says ‘[i]nsurance and law are
two practices of responsibility which operate quite heterogeneous
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categories, regimes, economies; as such, they are mutually exclusive in
their claims to totality’ (Ewald 1991: 201). The fundamental difference
between the two is that the juridical focus on the occurrence of an
event is singular and moral. By contrast, the insurantial approach
eschews any question of moral responsibility and instead factors the
probability of such an event occurring and recurring in a predictable
rule-like fashion (Ewald 1991: 203).
Peter Cane argues that the most significant characteristic of any tort
action is the correlativity of the parties: ‘Every cause of action in tort
has elements concerned with the conduct of interacting parties’ (1997:
13). As a consequence, the real implications of insurance coverage
generally do not figure in the courtroom because ‘it will always be
possible to rationalize a rule of tort law in terms of principles of personal
responsibility … even if it also rationalizes the decision in terms of loss
spreading’ (1997: 230). Horwitz argues that the correlative character
of tort litigation described by Cane is to some extent a chimera. He
says of the usual tort case that ‘[l]iability for injury has become just
another cost of doing business, which could be estimated, insured
against, and ultimately included in the price paid by the public’ (1982:
211). If one is talking about the standard personal injury claim then
Horwitz’s assessment of the current trajectory of tort litigation is
accurate. Fleming observes that a defendant’s insurance may very likely
undermine any deterring or punishing effect that might have followed
a finding of legal liability (1992: 10). This argument is supported by
Beck’s analysis of the effects of expert risk calculation: ‘the calculus
of risks … permits a type of “technological moralization” which no
longer need employ moral and ethical imperatives directly’ (1999: 51).
However, we need to allow that ‘technological moralization’ might
operate alongside, or simultaneously, with traditional notions of moral
causation. As Ewald reminds us in the case of toxic tort litigation,
the notion of ‘moral causation’ should not be discarded too readily.
Such litigation is not resolved by a simple reference to an insurantial
calculation of risk.
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Under the regime of juridical responsibility … [t]he accident is due to
some individual fault, imprudence or negligence; it cannot be a rule.
Moral thought uses accident as a principle of distinction … a unique affair
between individual protagonists (Ewald 1991: 203).

Insurers may have a capacity through the rule of subrogation to
dominate the litigation process but they do not litigate as if factors
beyond their own actuarial calculations are irrelevant. A determination
of legal liability in toxic tort cases inherently incorporates an assessment
of the moral culpability of not only the defendant but also the plaintiff.
That moral culpability is, as I argue further below, bound up with
assessments of whether the plaintiff was suitably risk-averse. In making
such assessments the courts weigh up competing accounts of the type
of risk to which the plaintiff was exposed. These accounts come from
the parties themselves, experts who provide technical assessments
of the hazard or harm to which the plaintiff was exposed and lay
witnesses such as workmates whose role is to furnish the court with
a real appreciation of the environment in which the plaintiff was
exposed to risk.

Scientific risk
Expert scientific evidence relating to causation, and to the risk presented
by exposure to a particular toxin, toxic event or environment, is an
integral part of all toxic tort litigation. Inevitably the manner in
which scientific disciplines such as epidemiology conceive of and
articulate risk impacts upon legal conceptions of risk. Epidemiology
is the study of ‘the incidence, distribution and aetiology of disease
in human populations and applies the findings to alleviate health
problems’ (Freckelton 2000: 133). The strength of the associations the
epidemiologist might find between a possible cause and the incidence
of disease depends upon excluding alternative causes as well as the size
of the population or cohort studied (Billauer, Moskowitz & Gallinari
1989: 66). Reliable epidemiological studies are available for only half of
the known and likely human carcinogens (Cranor & Eastmond 2001:
10). Nevertheless epidemiological studies have assumed considerable
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importance in toxic tort litigation not only because they allow the court
to make some sort of objective assessment on the question of causation
but also because they provide an identifiable basis for determining the
limits of the very foreseeability of toxic risk. Epidemiological expertise
forms part of the evidence which courts use to map a global picture
of the potential hazards to which a plaintiff may have been exposed.
It is from this global position that the conduct of both the parties is
judged. Edward Christie notes that:
A feature of a toxic tort dispute is that a plaintiff can rarely introduce
particularistic evidence which directly addresses the question of proof of
causation in the individual plaintiff ’s case … [P]arties must, instead, rely
on evidence which indicates an increased risk, or increased probability,
of disease incidence following exposure to a specific chemical (1992:
303).

Because epidemiological studies develop actuarial calculations of
risk which are generally not created for legal purposes, there is often
contest in litigation regarding the value or methodological reliability
of epidemiological evidence (Billauer, Moskowitz & Gallinari 1989:
66). Contest over the veracity of expert scientific evidence to some
extent merely reflects the fact that there is no such thing as scientific
objectivity or certainty. As Jacqueline Peel observes, ‘[t]he empirical
basis of science is both a strength and a weakness’ because the potential
for ‘various types of logical errors’ is inherent in all scientific knowledge
claims (2005: 35). Science in the courtroom is not the science of the
research laboratory: it is employed in an adversarial context. The
testimony of expert scientific witnesses is thus ‘strategically framed’
and the courts consider the evidence in that context ( Jasanoff 1995:
48). Indeed, Australian courts freely acknowledge that:
The pragmatic assessment of probable cause as a basis for tortious liability
cannot be wholly constrained by the scientific and philosophical purity
of epidemiology, which essentially depends upon a comparison of the
data obtained in controlled circumstances (EM Baldwin & Son Pty Ltd v
Plane; Jsekarb Pty Ltd v Plane).
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Steele notes that the court pragmatically employs an adjudicatory
model which ‘constructs a moment of decision which may be purely
hypothetical [knowledge of the risk which exposure to the toxin
presented at the time of the plaintiff ’s exposure] and uses this to
draw the “right” conclusion’ on whether the defendant should have
known of the risk and whether the exposure is likely to have caused
the injury (2004: 9). It is a dynamic apparent in the leading case of
Seltsam v McGuiness (hereinafter Seltsam) in which the NSW Court
of Appeal held that epidemiological studies ‘should be regarded as
circumstantial evidence which may, alone or in combination with
other evidence, establish causation in a specific case’ (¶63,566). The
court recognised epidemiology’s ‘potential utility’ in toxic tort cases
on the basis that it might ‘fill the gap’ where ‘medical science cannot
determine the existence or non-existence of a causal relationship
for purposes of attributing legal responsibility’ (Seltsam: ¶63,566).
However, despite Chief Justice Spigelman’s thorough examination of
the utility of epidemiological evidence, he did not identify the point
at which epidemiological or other forms of scientific evidence should
be considered compelling (Freckelton 2000: 140), largely because
that question can only be determined in the context of a wider body
of non-scientific evidence which combines, in Spigelman’s words,
with the epidemiological evidence like ‘strands in the cable’ and
from which causation might be inferred by the court as a matter
of ‘commonsense’ (Seltsam). But whose common sense? Is a judge’s
common sense in any way akin to that of the journalist working in
the ABC’s Brisbane studio, whose common sense tells her that despite
the lack of a conclusive scientific explanation, coincidence alone does
not explain why ten women in the one workplace have all developed
invasive breast cancer (Swan 2007)?
Jasanoff observes that the exercise of the court’s discretion (its
‘commonsense’) is inevitably shaped by the degree to which ‘judges are
swayed by their perceptions of what “science” is and who is a “scientist”
when they certify an expert’s credibility’ (1995: 59). Debate about the
proper interpretation of the United States Supreme Court’s ruling
on the standards that should apply in determining the admissibility
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of expert scientific evidence in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc (hereinafter Daubert) demonstrates how assessments of risk such
as those produced by epidemiologists are not neutral elements in the
legal assessment of risk. The debate regarding the proper interpretation
of Daubert is about more than simply what type of science should be
recognised in the court room — it concerns ‘the social and moral
viability of particular technological choices’ ( Jasanoff 1995: 65–6).
The Supreme Court took the opportunity in Daubert to develop
criteria which would allow courts to secure ‘relevant and reliable
evidence’ and overcome the inconsistent jurisprudence that had
developed in relation to the admissibility of expert evidence (Edmund
& Mercer 2004: 234). The court was persuaded by a number of
influential amicus briefs presented by corporate-sponsored think
tanks to privilege certain measures of scientific integrity, such as
Popper’s falsification standard, when determining the validity and
probative value of scientific evidence(Edmund & Mercer 2004: 244).
The Daubert decision listed four criteria trial judges should take into
account in assessing claimed expertise. The court indicated that these
criteria were intended as a guide only and that the inquiry should be
flexible. However, as is often the case when a superior court attempts
to set criteria for future guidance, the Daubert guide soon lost its
intended flexibility and qualification, and through its very application
was transformed into a checklist for the application of a fixed rule.
Edmund and Mercer note that in subsequent decisions Daubert has
become the basis for imposing a much more stringent admissibility
threshold (2004: 244, 250). Cranor and Eastmond suggest that courts
have ‘misunderstood or learned the wrong lessons’ from Daubert and
several other Bendectin cases, and that the courts now expect other
cases involving different toxins which have been subject to far less
scientific scrutiny than Bendectin to be able to meet impossibly high
evidentiary standards (2001: 9). As a consequence they argue, Daubert
reforms have locked out plaintiffs who have based their claim on
‘reliable, but not ideal, scientific evidence’ (2001: 6). Edmunds and
Mercer cite the fate of Newman v Motorola Inc (hereinafter Newman)
in support of the argument that:
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Daubert-inspired quests to establish scientific truth … may assist in
discouraging ongoing legal scrutiny of intransigent scientific controversies
involving uncertain risks (2004: 243).

Newman was one of the first cases relating to the hazards of mobile
(cell) phone use. Its failure has been significant for a large cluster of
potential toxic tort claims relating to the harm caused by mobile
phones (Edmunds & Mercer 2004: 239–40, Capriotti 2002). Blake J,
in a decision that was affirmed on appeal, rejected the evidence of the
plaintiff ’s expert epidemiological and oncological witness, Professor
Lennart Hardell. She did so by what Edmund and Mercer argue was
a ‘strategic manipulation of the Daubert criteria’ (2004: 240). While
Hardell’s research and opinion were not mainstream, the relevant ‘real
world’ science on the biological effects of electromagnetic radiation
and mobile phone use is hardly settled. Public concern about the risk
it presents, coupled with the want of scientific certainty about the risk,
has been serious enough to have generated independent inquiries in
several Western countries (Capriotti 2002: 2–3, Peel 2005: 108–9).
There simply has not been the passage of time and sufficient scientific
research to produce large-cohort epidemiological studies of the effects
of electromagnetic radiation generated by cell phones (Capriotti 2002:
4). Cranor and Eastmond note that even when a potential toxic hazard
comes to scientific attention it takes considerable time and resources to
accumulate a body of reliable scientific evidence evaluating its effect
on humans and the environment, and ‘it takes longer still to establish
a scientific consensus’ (2001: 13). In the case of Newman, Hardell’s
testimony was rejected on the basis that the judge disapproved of his
methodological approach (Newman: 14). Edmunds and Mercer argue
that her reasoning and approach to the admissibility of Hardell’s
evidence demonstrate how ‘ideal images of the scientific method can
be used in legal settings to help deconstruct or marginalize particular
forms of expertise’ and, in so doing, ‘restrict the entry of (novel)
scientific claims’ (2004: 241–2). The ‘commonsense’ approach of the
Australian cases to causation currently favours a broader, less idealised
approach to expert scientific evidence which recognises that scientific
evidence is unlikely to be able to fully determine questions of legal
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causation. However, what counts as ‘commonsense’ can shift and the
Daubert legacy in the US is instructive on this point.
When a court places greater emphasis on scientific evidence of the
causal nexus the plaintiff ’s lived experience of the hazard assumes less
importance in the proceedings. The trajectory of the Daubert ruling,
for instance, has been to shift the court’s attention away from a holistic
focus in which the ‘scientific evidence supports a claim framed in lay
terms’ towards what Karen Morrow has labelled, in her analysis of
British and Irish nuisance cases, a ‘harder’ approach to causation in
which the evidence of the plaintiff is marginalised in favour of scientific
evidence (Morrow 2000: 144–9 n32). In the nuisance case of Graham
and Graham v Re-Chem (hereinafter Graham) Morrow notes the court
was not satisfied that the plaintiffs’ evidence established a causal nexus
between the damage suffered by the plaintiffs and the emissions from
the defendant’s incinerator. Their evidence was judged ‘very confused
and confusing, contradictory and riddled with inconsistencies’ (quoted
in Morrow 2000: 148). The fact that there had been findings by official
inquiries regarding the hazards of the defendant’s incinerator was also
considered to be of little consequence, even when coupled with the
plaintiff ’s testimony. This was because the reports documenting that
risk were in general terms and did not evidence that activities of the
defendant specifically caused the plaintiff ’s damage. In essence, the
plaintiff ’s case failed in the court’s view because the plaintiffs had not
provided ‘detailed clinical, pathological and histological evidence of
… toxic insult’; their case was not buttressed by sufficiently persuasive
and detailed scientific evidence (quoted in Morrow 2000: 148).
It is possible to find cases which evidence both a ‘hard’ and a ‘soft’
approach to causation as Morrow has done. A court has immense
power to characterise a plaintiff ’s evidence, simply through language,
as either more or less authentic than the scientific evidence. In making
this point Morrow turns to the case of Hanrahan v Merck, Sharp &
Dohme (Ireland) Ltd, which stands in sharp contrast to Graham’s case.
On appeal in Hanrahan Henchy J found that the defendant’s expert
scientific evidence, based on readings of emissions from the plant
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and computer models, did not pay due attention to the ‘real physical
context of the emissions’ as evidenced by the plaintiff ’s witnesses. He
held that ‘[t]heoretical or inductive evidence cannot be allowed to
displace proven facts … [This] would be to allow scientific theory to
dethrone fact’ (quoted in Morrow 2000: 146).
The degree to which a court aligns ‘legal causation with scientific
causation’ not only determines what type of science will count in the
litigation, it will also impact upon the significance and weight attached
to other forms of non-scientific evidence (Edmonds & Mercer 2002:
103). The discussion now turns to examine the relevance of other
non-scientific, and quite subjective, calculations of risk.

Risk and common sense
In our ‘lived life’ we tend to understand risk in terms of its common or
everyday meaning rather than as an actuarial calculation or an object
of scientific analysis. In its common, everyday sense, risk is a term
used to describe danger or hazard (Ewald 1991). Risks of this kind are
not statistical calculations, they are social or cultural constructs. Such
ideas of risk often have some genesis in a scientific prediction of risk,
but they have developed to encompass an array of popular knowledge,
beliefs and practices that are not limited by the confines of scientific
discourse (Douglas 1992: 24). Research by cognitive psychologists
has demonstrated that
‘lay’ people evaluate health and environmental threats according to a
different set of criteria than may be reflected in expert assessments. …
[T]he risk perception of lay members of the community appears to be
influenced by various contextual factors that lie outside the realm of
scientific research (Peel 2005: 68).

These factors include familiarity with a technology, the degree
of control which can be asserted over it and the potential for the
application of the technology to have catastrophic effects (Peel 2005:
68). Jasanoff observes that
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people will tolerate a higher probability of death and injury from activities
that they feel they can meaningfully control (smoking, eating, automobile
driving) then from activities that heighten their sense of powerlessness or
distrust (nuclear power, pesticide use, air transportation) (1995: 13).

Robert Lee argues that ‘the public experience of risk is not one of
unthinking acceptance of a position expounded by experts, nor is it a
simple choice between expert positions’ (2000: 86). Notwithstanding
the trend in some post Daubert litigation in the United States, risk is
not calculated solely according to expert scientific evidence by courts
in toxic tort litigation either. In Chappel v Hart the Australian High
Court observed causation is ‘a question of fact resolved as matter
of commonsense and experience[;] the conclusion is often reached
intuitively’ (Chappel v Hart: 562).
A plaintiff ’s subjective appreciation of their toxic exposure and its
consequences is as vital as evidence of the defendant’s conduct to the
court’s determination of legal liability. This dynamic is readily apparent
in Seaman J’s decision in Napolitano v CSR Ltd (hereinafter Napolitano).
The plaintiff in that case, Mr Napolitano, had worked for two years
for the defendant in its blue asbestos mine in Wittenoom. He sued the
defendant in tort not only because he had developed mesothelioma (a
fatal asbestos-related disease) but also because over a period of years
he had developed a psychiatric illness which he attributed to his longstanding fear that he would succumb to mesothelioma. The defendants
admitted liability for the plaintiff ’s mesothelioma but denied liability for
his psychiatric illness. The court regarded the ‘question of liability for
psychiatric injury to be a matter of major complexity’ (Napolitano: 6).
Nevertheless the judgment is characterised by a pragmatic and candid
take on the evidence rather than the usual careful rationalisation and
artifice that attaches to judicial decision-making. Seaman J’s decision has
been criticised for its ‘lack of analysis of principle or authority’ (Mullany
1997: 137). But for the purposes of this discussion it is perhaps all the
more instructive for that omission, as it means the clinical gaze of the
court on the particulars of the plaintiff ’s experience of living with the
risk of such massive past exposure to asbestos is all the more apparent.
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It was necessary for the court to establish on the balance of
probabilities that the plaintiff ’s ‘illness of mind’ was caused by the
defendants’ conduct — that causal nexus was ‘determined by applying
common-sense to the facts’ of the case (Napolitano: 20). Seaman J
cursorily distinguished Mr Napolitano’s situation from other nervous
shock cases and then refocused on the particulars of the plaintiff ’s
case, observing that:
It seems to me the controlling features of liability for psychiatric illness
cannot be determined in the abstract and this case cannot turn on statements
of policy apt to very different factual situations (Napolitano: 22).

Anxiety or fear of contracting a disease is not, on its own, a
basis for any form of compensation beyond payment for medical
monitoring of the plaintiff ’s health. Seaman J did not break from
that legal requirement. Mr Napolitano’s condition was a recognisable
mental illness, but analysis of the judgement suggests that it was the
particulars of Mr Napolitano’s experience and fear, made palpable by
the psychiatric diagnosis and ultimately vindicated by the fact that Mr
Napolitano was to die of the very disease he feared, that primarily
motivated the judge’s decision. Seaman J’s conclusion was that Mr
Napolitano had suffered ‘a very long period of misery and anxiety
and fear’ (Napolitano: 25) and that his
depressive illness was induced by the perception of the plaintiff of the
distressing phenomena of asbestos-induced illness in his fellow Wittenoom
workers who were his friends and in particular Mr Cinquina [his best
friend] (Napolitano: 20–1).

Mullany suggests that ‘[o]ne gleans the impression from his
judgement that Seaman J simply formed the opinion that it was just
in the particular circumstances to compensate the plaintiff ’ (1997:
137). This notion of what is ‘just’ leads us to the next point of this
discussion, which is that legal liability in toxic tort actions is very
much determined in the context of a moral evaluation of the parties’
conduct and of their attitude and response to risk.
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Together with an expectation that the individual will monitor himor herself and be risk-averse, risk in its commonly understood sense has,
according to the social anthropologist Mary Douglas (1992), become
inextricably linked with blame. Whereas the technical calculations
of epidemiological risk are treated as objective everyday notions of
risk are a basis for ascribing moral culpability. In the courtroom toxic
tort litigation, despite its consideration of detailed scientific evidence,
appears to turn as much upon moral assessment of the parties’ conduct as
on scientific argument and testimony or points of law. Indeed, Robert
Rabin describes tobacco litigation in the United States as ‘a last vestige
of a vision of nineteenth century tort law as an interpersonal morality
play’ (1993: 122). The clinical risk approach (discussed below) that
conceptualises risk in terms of the impact on specific individuals is
taken up here in part because it facilitates analysis of how the moral
conduct of the parties is framed and assessed in toxic tort litigation.

Clinical risk assessment
The main consideration of much risk commentary in the social
sciences is how risk is produced by collective anxiety and politics (Beck
1992, Douglas 1992), or as a function of certain forms of scientific or
actuarial calculations (for a survey of this commentary see Lupton 1999,
O’Malley 2004). When legal commentators consider the function of
risk assessment in litigation, their focus also tends to be on actuarial
or other scientific calculations of risk. It is a literature that is rarely
interested in how the individual actually engages or copes with, or is
otherwise affected by, risk. The clinical approach to thinking about
risk which is prevalent in public health programs is taken up in this
argument because its focus is on the relationship between expert
assessments of risk and the individual as an individual (not simply as a
member of a risk-prone population). Clinical risk approaches, informed
by risk expertise, develop programs which aim to reduce the exposure
of members of these groups, rather than whole populations, to risk
(O’Malley 2004: 22, Weir 1996).
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Public health programs — such as those aimed at pregnant
women, drug-users or smokers — use clinical risk techniques such
as diagnoses and therapeutics. The clinician, working on the basis
of ‘probabilistic indicators of future conditions’ or ‘risk’ to a certain
type of patient’s health, develops a program of intervention aimed at
minimising these risks (O’Malley 2004: 22). For example, in light
of known risk factors gleaned from epidemiological studies and past
clinical experience, pregnant women have become subject to an
increasing array of interventions aimed at protecting the health of
the unborn foetus. Regular ultrasounds and blood tests are scheduled
for the pregnant woman/patient; she will be advised what foods she
should eat and which she should avoid; she is told to abstain from
alcohol, quit smoking and even, when it might be appropriate, to
consider terminating a pregnancy (O’Malley 2004: 7–8, Weir 1996).
The clinical governance of pregnancy allows an expectant mother
to ‘identify generic pregnancy anxieties’ with her own ‘particular
characteristics and behaviour’ (O’Malley 2004: 8). These types of
clinical interventions are not simply imposed on a passive patient;
being pregnant is shaped and framed by a wider public discourse
and common knowledge of how one should manage pregnancy — a
knowledge that was not available to previous generations of pregnant
women. O’Malley, taking up Lorna Weir’s (1996) analysis, argues that
the experience and responsibility of being pregnant have changed such
that a rational expectant mother will now not only accept but positively
embrace and seek out the clinician’s advice (O’Malley 2004: 8).
Toxic tort litigation is not therapeutic, beyond the fact that
successful litigation and/or the threat of further litigation forces some
defendants who are found liable to reform their practices so that the
hazard of exposure is limited or eradicated. However, it is argued
here that the focus of clinical risk techniques on the individual’s
exposure to risk is a useful way of thinking about how the figure of
the plaintiff (like the patient) is constructed within the domain of toxic
tort litigation. This focus on the formation of the plaintiff is necessary
to this discussion because, despite the broader risk discourse within
which any toxic tort litigation takes place, the individual litigating
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parties remain the primary focus of the court (Cane 1997: 13). Jasanoff
observes that in this type of litigation the courts tend to
favour a holistic (or medical) to a reductionist, or toxicological model
of illness. The holistic view focuses on the suffering individual and asks
whether, given the totality of circumstances, this person could have been
affected in the stated way by the stated exposure … this approach presumes
that issues of general or specific causation must be addressed together,
within the context of the plaintiff’s lived life (1995: 125 emphasis added).

Whether or not the plaintiff, as much as the defendant, adopted
appropriate risk-averse behaviour in the face of risk is implicated in the
court’s assessment of the plaintiff ’s case. The dynamic which I suggest
operates is identified in sociological terms by Deborah Lupton:
The modern concept of risk, like that of taboo, has a ‘forensic’ property,
for it works backwards in explaining ill-fortune, as well as forwards in
predicting future retribution. Thus the experience of a heart attack, a
positive HIV test result, or the discovery of a cancerous lesion are evidence
that the ill person has failed to comply with directives to reduce health risks
and therefore is to be blamed for his or her predicament (1993: 430).

The clinical risk approach highlights the manner by which the
toxic tort litigation constructs a certain type of legal subject. The
success of the plaintiff ’s case will in part be determined by whether
they are able to situate themselves as risk-averse or irresponsible in
the face of known risk (Morrow 2000, Rabin 1993, Toffolon-Weiss
& Roberts 2004).

Risk, blame, responsibility and liability
As Ewald (1991) observes, how we construct and understand risks
determines our response to them. For example, a materially founded
apprehension of risk (such as the fact that past heavy exposure to
asbestos may cause mesothelioma some time in the future, or findings
of abnormally high lead levels in a pre-school child) is apt to produce
anxiety, especially if there is no technical capacity to control the
risk (Beck 1992, Douglas 1992, Lee 2000). By contrast, if risks are
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understood as probabilities they are seemingly amenable to control in
a number of forms (although that control may not be so much real as
contrived). It may be control exercised at a distance through insurance,
or it might be control exercised at the level of the individual, as in
a clinical setting where the clinician situates the individual and her
lifestyle or patterns of consumption against a background of known
risk (O’Malley 2004).
The knowability of risk, underpinned by the scientific capacity to
identify hazardous activities and substances, imposes responsibility not
only on hazard creators but also on their potential victims. It produces
a moral imperative to actively take up risk-averse behaviour, such as
giving up smoking or employing work-safe practices (O’Malley 2004).
Lupton argues that, in a sociological sense, risk in modern society has
come to replace the old-fashioned (and, in modern secular society, now
largely discredited) notion of sin as a term that ‘runs across the gamut
of social life to moralise and politicise dangers’ (1993: 428).
For the tort plaintiff who has been the victim of exposure to a lethal
toxic substance in circumstances where others had responsibility for
their well-being, the opportunity for a ‘day in court’ is an opportunity
for the moral rightness of their claim to be recognised. While it is not
being argued that a court deciding a toxic tort case necessarily frames
its decision solely in terms of moral culpability of the parties, blame and
responsibility are nevertheless central to the discourse within which
the case is argued and considered. Cane observes that:
Tort law is concerned with people’s responsibility for their acts and
omissions. And because it deals with interactions between people, it
contains principles relevant not only to the conduct of injurers but also
to the conduct of victims (1997: 13).

The allocation of blame and the finding of liability are influenced
by subjective assessments of the moral character and reputation of the
litigants. The fact that expert calculations of risk tend to produce an
amoralisation of the dispute does not necessarily preclude non-expert
understandings of risk becoming the basis for ascribing blame.
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Asbestos and tobacco litigation:
The credibility of the plaintiff
Liability in toxic tort cannot be assessed outside the context of the broader
cultural values about risk-taking. On this point the relative success of
tobacco and asbestos litigation is instructive. Public concern about and
knowledge of the risks associated with both asbestos and tobacco is
sophisticated and widespread. The hazards of exposure to tobacco and
asbestos are readily identifiable and scientific evidence of the injuries that
can be caused by exposure to each toxin is well documented (Kune &
Kune 2003). Because the practical scientific limitations of establishing
an association between exposure to either of these toxins and harm is not
as significant as it has proved to be in other types of toxic tort claims, it
is not surprising that tobacco and asbestos litigation have become two
notable categories of toxic tort (Rabin 2001: 352–3).
In contrast to plaintiffs whose injuries are the result of asbestos
exposure, plaintiffs claiming compensation for smoking-related injuries
have generally not had the same degree of success. The difference
between the relative success of the asbestos and tobacco toxic tort
litigation does not lay in the scientific evidence, as there is a wealth
of evidence available regarding the toxic nature of exposure to both
asbestos and tobacco. The factor which marks the difference between
the two types of tort is the circumstances in which each type of toxic
exposure typically occurs. It is not only the court’s view of what
is required by the law to establish causation which finds a plaintiff
with asbestos-related lung cancer in a better position than a plaintiff
with smoking-induced lung cancer. It is also the clinical focus of the
litigation on ‘particulars’, on the individual’s attitude to risk and the
care and responsibility the individual has taken for him- or herself.
In his account of the fate of tobacco litigation in the United States,
Rabin (1993) has observed that there are two different types of plaintiffs
in toxic tort litigation: those who are characterised as victims and
those who are seen as irresponsible. Deep-pocket tobacco company
defendants have relied with some success on arguments that smokerplaintiffs have not acted responsibly in failing to heed health warnings
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printed on tobacco product packaging and advertising (Capriotti 2002:
7, Kearns 1999). In an observation highlighting the significance of
the court’s clinical focus on the plaintiff ’s conduct in the face of toxic
exposure, Rabin argues that the plaintiff faces considerable difficulty in
managing the expert evidence relating to the health effects or addictive
nature of smoking, despite the fact that in a strictly evidential sense it
supports the plaintiff ’s case.
[T]he addiction expert’s translation of scientific data on reinforcement,
withdrawal, reactive effects, and other esoteric phenomena into terms
that make sense to the jury remains a rather abstract undertaking. The
expert is in no position to say anything about the individual smoker …
By contrast, the defense on the addiction issue is grounded in particulars:
the claimant could have quit, knew the risks, evinced a life-long taste for
dangerous activities, and so forth (1993: 124).

To succeed, the tobacco plaintiff has to be able to argue a case that
moves beyond the blame that everyday conceptions of risk attach to
their failure to be risk-averse. By contrast, the plaintiff who has been
exposed to asbestos was usually not in a position to voluntarily limit
his or her exposure. The moral claim of the asbestos-diseased plaintiff
is illuminated by the fact that the world’s major asbestos producers
knew of the dangers of asbestos exposure and conspired to keep it a
secret (Rabin 2001: 353). Since the revelation of the ‘Cigarette Papers’
plaintiffs in tobacco litigation are now able to take up a similar strategy,
particularly those who commenced smoking in their childhood before
the dangers of cigarette-smoking were widely known in the public
domain, or those who switched to low-tar cigarettes in the mistaken
belief that they presented less risk to health (Rabin 2001).
This focus on the credibility of the plaintiff operates in other toxic
tort litigation as well. In their study of several tort actions relating
to the toxic contamination of land and urban housing in Louisiana,
Melissa Toffolon-Weis and Timmons Roberts observe that many of
the plaintiffs in those cases were poor and had limited access to quality
health care. As a result they had only a limited appreciation of the
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factors that posed a risk to health. The credibility of their claims was
readily undermined because the plaintiffs
may have been exposed to dangerous work and lifestyle factors that are
often presented by the defense as alternative causative factors. Government
and corporate officials do not take the symptoms of these people seriously.
They attribute the poor health of these communities to unhealthy lifestyles
(eg. eating fatty foods, smoking, drinking alcohol and taking drugs) ….
Further, middle class jurors’ own prejudices may affect their judgments
when viewing poorer individuals with different life experiences (ToffolonWeis & Roberts 2004: 261).

Morrow’s analysis of the nuisance cases in Ireland and England
also shows that a defendant can prevent the success of a plaintiff ’s
claim, even in the face of what seems to be strong scientific evidence
of causation, by discrediting the plaintiff ’s lifestyle and conduct. Just as
a worker with lung cancer following asbestos exposure has to counter
claims that his past tobacco use may in part be responsible for his
injuries, Morrow found that farmers who complained that their health,
and that of their livestock, were effected by toxic emissions had to
counter claims that their illness was attributable not to the defendant
but rather to their own unhealthy lifestyle and poor farming practices
(Morrow 2000: 149). In some cases the causal link between the toxic
emissions and the damage suffered may well have been tenuous, but
the point is that the plaintiff is unlikely to succeed unless she or he can
demonstrate that they have been risk-aware and risk-averse.
The very fact that toxic tort actions are necessarily premised on
what Cane (1997) labels the ‘correlativity’ of the parties may make
them an uncertain prospect if a plaintiff is not able to convincingly
argue their moral claim to compensation. Lee, developing Cane’s
analysis, contends that liability in tort is determined in the context of
certain assumptions about socially appropriate conduct; tort law is a
means of enforcing ‘social rules’ (2000: 78). The function of ‘social
rules’ and the moral dynamic of an assessment of risk and liability is
evident in the case of Christopher Haar v Uneedus Scaffolding Pty Ltd
(hereinafter Haar), in which the responsibility of both the defendant
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employer and the plaintiff employee were assessed in the context of the
broader cultural values about risk taking. Mr Haar had been exposed
to asbestos in the late 1970s in his employment as a rigger. He worked
alongside other workers employed by a different contractor to remove
asbestos from the building around which Harr was erecting scaffolds.
In breach of a range of health and safety regulations, Haar’s defendant
employer neither provided any special clothing to protect Haar against
asbestos nor require him to wear any, even though the asbestos-removal
workers wore special masks and suits. What might seem a clear-cut case
against the defendant was muddied by the defendant’s counterclaim
that Harr’s smoking was implicated in the development of his cancer.
The defendant claimed that because Harr was aware at the time of the
hazards of smoking he was contributorily negligent. The jury reduced
the damages award by twenty percent for contributory negligence but
the presiding judge declined to accept the jury’s finding. O’Bryan J
held that even though at the time of Haar’s exposure health warnings
were printed on cigarette and tobacco packaging, and even though
Haar had not denied that he had been aware that there was some
scientific evidence that smoking could cause cancer, he had not acted
negligently. The law of contributory negligence required the court to
consider Haar’s conduct in light of ‘the circumstances and conditions in
which he had to do his work’ (Podreresek v Australian Iron and Steel Pty
Ltd). Those conditions, it was held, included the fact that most manual
workers smoked. Site agreements at the time even allowed workers
designated ‘smoko’ breaks. O’Bryan J held that, despite the increased
public awareness of the hazards of tobacco consumption, smoking was
a routine, normal, accepted practice of workers in Haar’s circumstances
at the time, so this did not make him culpable for his injury.

Concluding comments
The case of the women who developed breast cancer while working at
the ABC Brisbane news studio and offices highlights the difficulty of
identifying the toxic hazards of post-industrial society, while the case
of the people who were exposed to lead in Esperance is evidence of the
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unpredictable nature of exposure to toxic hazards. Each of these incidents
of toxic exposure has prompted the respective state governments to
conduct inquiries into the circumstances surrounding the exposure
and has been the subject of extended media report. These people have
encountered the type of lurking toxic hazard that commentators such
as Beck (1992) and Douglas (1992) argue we have come to dread. Toxic
tort litigation is a response to this sort of exposure. It provides a means
for claiming compensation not provided by other investigative initiatives
such as a government inquiry. But perhaps as significantly, toxic tort
litigation reveals and reports the existence of environmental hazards in
a manner which focuses on the impact of the toxin on them personally,
and publicly delineates the harm they have suffered. Unlike a public
inquiry, which inevitably produces a generalised account of the toxic
exposure, toxic tort litigation allows the articulation of the real, rather
than simply theorised or projected, experience and consequence of toxic
exposure (Kroll-Smith & Westervelt 2004).
But suing in toxic tort is not straightforward. The ubiquitous
and unpredictable nature of exposure to toxic hazards means that
establishing foreseeability of the risk and causation are more, rather than
less, typical of any potential toxic tort claim. The focus of discussion
here has not been so much on assessing whether these particular cases
would succeed if a toxic tort claim was made, but rather on considering
the interface of the different types of evidence a court hearing a toxic
tort case is likely to consider. Four interrelated concepts of ‘risk’ have
been employed as a device for comparing the various ways in which a
plaintiff ’s claim is conceptualised and assessed in toxic tort litigation.
These conjunctions of risk include insurantial, scientific, common sense
and clinical notions producing a heterogeneous and multi-dimensional
understanding of how a court assesses a toxic tort claim. While the
central focus of the litigation is the plaintiff ’s situated and particular
experience of the toxic exposure, their claim is also assessed in light of
more theoretical and generalised constructions of toxic risk, as well as
commonly held attitudes to managing the risk of toxic exposure that
assume the plaintiff, and not just the defendant, is an informed and
‘rational’ individual, both risk-aware and risk-averse.
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